digitalcommons.nyls.edu
Faculty Scholarship

Articles & Chapters

2000

Globalization, Human Rights and Critical Race
Feminism: Voices from the Margins
Penelope Andrews
New York Law School, penelope.andrews@nyls.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/fac_articles_chapters
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the Law and Gender Commons
Recommended Citation
Andrews, Penelope, "Globalization, Human Rights and Critical Race Feminism: Voices from the Margins" (2000). Articles & Chapters.
1284.
https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/fac_articles_chapters/1284

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at DigitalCommons@NYLS. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Articles & Chapters by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@NYLS.

Content downloaded/printed from

HeinOnline

Sun Jul 28 06:57:19 2019
Citations:
Bluebook 20th ed.
Penelope E. Andrews, Globalization, Human Rights and Critical Race Feminism: Voices
from the Margins, 3 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 373, 400 (2000).
APA 6th ed.
Andrews, P. E. (2000). Globalization, human rights and critical race feminism: Voices
from the margins. Journal of Gender, Race and Justice, 3(2), 373-400.
Chicago 7th ed.
Penelope E. Andrews, "Globalization, Human Rights and Critical Race Feminism: Voices
from the Margins," Journal of Gender, Race and Justice 3, no. 2 (Spring 2000):
373-400
McGill Guide 9th ed.
Penelope E Andrews, "Globalization, Human Rights and Critical Race Feminism: Voices
from the Margins" (2000) 3:2 J Gender Race & Just 373.
MLA 8th ed.
Andrews, Penelope E. "Globalization, Human Rights and Critical Race Feminism: Voices
from the Margins." Journal of Gender, Race and Justice, vol. 3, no. 2, Spring 2000,
pp. 373-400. HeinOnline.
OSCOLA 4th ed.
Penelope E Andrews, 'Globalization, Human Rights and Critical Race Feminism: Voices
from the Margins' (2000) 3 J GENDER RACE & JUST 373
Provided by:
New York Law School<br>The Mendik Library
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance of HeinOnline's Terms and
Conditions of the license agreement availablehttps://heinonline.org/HOL/License
at
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope of your license, please use:
Copyright Information
Use QR Code reader to send PDF to your smartphone or tablet device

Globalization, Human Rights and Critical Race
Feminism: Voices from the Margins
PenelopeE. Andrews*
I.

INTRODUCTION

II.

VIOLENCE AGAINSTWOMEN IN SOUTH AFRICA AND ABORIGINAL WOMEN

IN AUSTRALIA

A. South Africa
B. Australia
I1. GLOBALIZATION AND FEMINIST INTERVENTION

A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

Our GlobalNeighborhood?:The Phenomenon of Globalization
Hierarchiesof Human Rights
Women and Globalization
FeministInterventions in InternationalHuman Rights Discourse
Violence Against Women: GlobalStrategies

IV. VOICES FROM THE MARGINS: THE CONTRIBUTION OF A CRITICAL RACE
FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE
V.

CONCLUSION

Two vignettes:

South Africa:
When you leave your child alone in the home she is not safe. And in
the street, she is not safe. And in the school she is not safe. There is
nowhere that she can walk and be safe. Girls are afraid somebody in
a car will stop them and say "get in." When they walk in the street they
are raped by men with guns. Sexual abuse happens so much that some
students stop going to school.'
Australia:
Evidence was presented to the Inquiry which indicated that Aboriginal
and Islander women and girls have been sexually threatened and
*
Associate Professor of Law, City University of New York, School of Law. B.A., LL.B.,
University of Natal; LL.M., Columbia University. I wish to thank the students of The Journalof
Gender,Race & Justice for organizing the 1998 Symposium. I also want to thank the members of the
Northeast Corridor Collective for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. They include:
Paulette Caldwell, Pamela Edwards, Tanya Hemandez, Ellen James, Beryl Jones, Holly McGuigan and
Twila Perry.

I. HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH/AFRICA & HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WOMEN'S RIGHTS PROJECT,
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN SOUTH AFRICA: THE STATE RESPONSE TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND
RAPE 55 (1995) (quoting Diane Russell, Rape and Child Sexual Abuse in Soweto: An Interview with
Community Leader Mary Mabaso, CAPE TOwN: CENTRE FOR AFRICAN STUDIES, Mar. 26, 1991, at 7).
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abused by police officers. In Mossman (northern Qld) an Aboriginal
woman alleged that she had been raped by a police officer whilst in
custody. There were also complaints from Alice Springs that
Aboriginal teenage girls had been assaulted and raped by police
officers and other white males. Evidence was received from a nonAboriginal person who had witnessed a police officer detain and lineup young Aboriginal women outside the Burketown (Qld) hotel on
Friday nights during early 1988. The officer then offered the young
women to white male patrons in the bar for sex.2
I. INTRODUCTION

I have recalled elsewhere the details of violence against women in South
Africa3 and Australia.' Both of these countries, although markedly different in
their demographics, politics, and history, share a colonial past where race was
the fault line throughout.' Although there were marked differences in the
colonial structure and various policies of the colonial administrators, both
societies shared certain patriarchal attitudes that cemented during the colonial
period and left a particular legacy of violence against black women. In both, the
incidence of violence against women was so systemic and so ubiquitous that it
has been described as a continuing violation of their human rights.6 The
HUMAN RIGHTS &EQUALOPPORTUNITY COMM'N, RACIST VIOLENCE: REPORT OFNATIONAL
2.
INQUIRY INTO RACIST VIOLENCE INAUSTRALIA 88 (1991).
3.
See Penelope E. Andrews, Violence Against Women in South Africa: The Role of Culture
and the Limitations of the Law, 8 TEMP. POL. & Clv. RTS. L. REv. 425 (1999) (describing the "role of
culture in perpetuating violence against women").
4. See Penelope E. Andrews, Violence Against Aboriginal Women in Australia:Possibilities
for Redress Within the International Human Rights Framework, 60 ALB. L. REv. 917 (1997)
(addressing the "issue of violence against Aboriginal women").
5.
The patterns of colonialism in the two societies differed, for example, with respect to land
and labor. In South Africa, the dispossession of Africans of their land was motivated by conflicting
needs for cheap black labor and a desire to maintain "political security" in "white" areas. See Geoff
Budlender, Incorporationand Exclusion: Recent Developments in Labuor and Influx Control, I S.
AFR. J. ON HuM. RTs. 3, 3 (1985). In Australia, Aboriginal labor was not required since this was
provided by convicts in the newly established British convict colony. See generally Sidney L. Harring,
The Killing Time: A History ofAboriginalResistance in ColonialAustralia,26 OTrOWA L. REv. 385
(1994) (analyzing the nineteenth century conflict between Aboriginal tribes and colonists and attempts
to frame the conflict within the common law tradition). Aboriginal dispossession of land merely
satisfied the settlers' need for more land. Id. Aboriginal resistance led to their near annihilation. Id.
6.
See Suzanne Daley, Young, Vulnerable and Violated in the New South Africa, N.Y. TIMES,
July 12, 1998, § 6 (Magazine), at 30 (describing the high incidence of rape of South African children);
see also generallyAUDREY BOLGER, ABORIGINAL WOMEN AND VIOLENCE (1991) (describing the facts,
figures and causes of violence against women in Australia); Diane Bell, Representing Aboriginal
Women: Who Speaksfor Whom?, in THE RIGHTS OF SUBORDINATED PEOPLES 221, 238-46 (Oliver
Mendelsohn & Upendra Baxi eds., 1994) (describing an anthropological representation of Aboriginal
women and how that relates to violence against those women).
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intersection of colonialism, patriarchy and violence and its consequences for
black women informs the main thesis of this paper, namely, critical race
feminism and its particular perspective on the issue of violence against women.
In other words, this paper addresses the following question: How can critical
race feminism contribute to the continuing feminist project of unmasking
structures, legal and otherwise, that generate, tolerate and acquiesce in violence
against women?
Colonialism's rampant racism, patriarchy, and cultures of masculinity left
women in a particularly vulnerable position. In excavating the many causes of
violence, my paper references not just the colonial experience, but the remnants
and effects of both colonial and indigenous culture. In both South Africa and
Australia, however, it was the ordinary processes of law and legalism which
kept the colonial structures in place and which continue to raise questions about
the role of law today. In my paper, the theme, violence against women, will
combine the focus of these two societies.
At the outset, I need to commence with an explanation about the
assumptions inherent in the title, namely critical race feminism. Iowe Paulette
Caldwell and Taunya Lovell Banks a particular note of thanks for enlightening
me on the origins of critical race theory, subsequent developments and
contemporary debates. I am uncomfortable at the labeling because it suggests
a certain uniformity and consensus about critical theory that does not reflect the
rich body of work now incorporated under the rubric "critical race theory."7
What combines these writings is a concern with the persistence of racism in the
United States and the interplay of race and the law. As Jerome Culp has
elucidated:
Critical race theory is not uni-perspectival; there is no single consensus
of a characterization of the theory. Certainly the name "critical race
theory" suggests some connection to critical legal theory, yet its name
derives more directly from the name "critical theory" by which some
refer to the tenets of the Frankfurt School of Philosophy of Habermas
and Marcuse. The contributors to critical race theory have resisted
defining themselves.'
Some writers, labeled as critical race theorists, utilize a non-traditional
methodology, namely story-telling, to highlight and to humanize personal

7.
See, e.g., CRmcAL RACE FEMINISM: A READER (Adrien Katherine Wing ed., 1997) (a
collection of critical race feminism articles); CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTrING EDGE (Richard
Delgado ed., 1995) (a collection of critical race articles).
8.
Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Posneron Duncan Kennedy and Racial Difference: White
Authority in the LegalAcadenzy, 41 DuKE L.J. 1095, 1096 n.5 (1992).
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experiences of racial subordination. 9 Patricia J. Williams' narratives provide a
particularly eloquent example."t Others have insisted that the law incorporates
the intersectionality of gender, race, ethnicity and socio-economic status to fully
account for and attempt to overcome the contemporary burden of disadvantages
under which a disproportionate number of African-American women labor."
Others have suggested a more expansive interrogation of racial reparations, 2
whilst some have assessed ways of racial coalition building. 3 Increasingly
scholars of color have contributed to the dynamic body of critical theory,
incorporating the perspectives of Asians and Latinos. 14 This cryptic listing of
scholars does not even begin to do justice to the prolific body of work gathered
under the rubric of critical race theory/feminism.t 5
9.

See, e.g., PATRICIA J. WILLiAMs, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991) [hereinafter

WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE] (using narrative that Williams describes as a "diary of a law

professor"); PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ROOSTER'S EGG (1995) [hereinafter WILLIAMS, THE
ROOSTER'S EGG] (using narrative to discuss race and racial history); Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hair
Piece: Perspectiveson the Intersection of Race and Gender, 1991 DuKE L.J. 365 (using narrative to
describe being a black woman); Judy Scales-Trent, Commonalities: On Being Black and White,
Different and the Same, 2 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 290 (1990) (using narrative to describe being black
and looking white).
10. See generallyWILLIAMS, THEALCHEMYOFRACE, supranote 9; WILLIAMS,THEROOSTER'S
EGG, supra note 9.
11. See Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black
Feminist Critique of AntidiscriminationDoctrine,Feminist Theory and AntiracistPolitics, 1989 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 139 (arguing that the combination of race and sex produces a different experience for
African-American women); Angela Harris, Raceand Essentialismin FeministLegal Theory, 42 STAN.
L. REV. 581 (1991) (arguing that black women are often ignored in feminist and legal theory, and that
feminist legal theory should challenge the law's tendency to privilege the abstract and unitary voice).
12. See, e.g., Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: CriticalLegal Studies andReparations,
22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 323 (1987) (arguing that adopting the perspective of those who have
experienced discrimination can greatly assist critical scholars).
13. See, e.g., TaunyaLovellBanks, Both Edges ofthe Margin:Blacks andAsiansin Mississippi
Masala,Barriersto CoalitionBuilding, 5 ASIAN L.J. 7 (1998) (calling for the engagement of coalition
building among minority groups). For a thoughtful analysis of Derrick Bell's scholarship (widely
regarded as a "founder" of the critical race theory movement), see Leroy D. Clarke, A Critique of
ProfessorDerrickA. Bell's Thesis on the Permanenceof Racism and His Strategy of Confrontation,
73 DENv. U. L REv. 23, 45 (1995) (calling for a broad-based, non-racial, cooperative coalition of
individuals committed to advancing civil rights).
14. See, e.g., Sharon K. Hom, Commentary: Re-Positioning Human Rights on "Asian"
Perspectives, 3 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 251 (1997) (analyzing human rights law from an Asian
perspective); Berta Esperanza Hemhndez-Truyol, Indivisible Identities: Culture Clashes, Confused
Constructsand Reality Checks, 2 HARv. LATINO L. REv. 199 (1997) (articulating a LatCrit theory);
Tanya Kateri Hernandez, "Multiracial"Discourse: Racial Classificationsin an Era of Color-Blind
Jurisprudence,57 MD. L. REV. 97 (1998) (questioning the assumptions that underlie the meanings of
"multi-racial discourse').
15. Regina Austin's scholarship is particularly provocative. See, e.g., Regina Austin, Sapphire
Bound!, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 539 (decrying the dearth of writings on the legal problems of minority
women); see also Monica J. Evans, Stealing Away: Black Women, Outlaw Culture and the Rhetoric
ofRights,28 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.REv. 263 (1993) (examining black women as shapers and transmitters
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The attempts by critical race theorists to excavate the intersectionality and
multiplicity of perspectives and incorporate them in legal theory have subjected
them to critiques by liberal and conservative scholars. 16 Despite these critiques,
critical race theorists continue the imperatives of vigilance towards the
persistence of structures of racial subjugation and oppression which appear to
be inviolate and to certain racial attitudes which remain intractable and
misguided. 7
My contribution to these issues emanates from a combination of the various
schools of thought which have influenced my perspectives. My attitudes are
deeply steeped in the liberal non-racial tradition espoused by the Reverend

Martin Luther King, Jr. and by President Nelson Mandela."8 In addition, I have
been schooled and persuaded by the imperatives of the many feminisms, 9 been
skeptical of postmodern claims 0 and engaged by critical race theory."a
of a positive, outlaw culture). Adrien Wing has done a sterling job of gathering together the work of
critical race feminists. See CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM: A READER, supranote 7. For a comprehensive
volume of critical race scholarship, see CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE, supra note 7.

16. See RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAw 368-84 (1995) (criticizing, among other things,
the claim that critical race theory uses narration); see also Randall Kennedy, Racial Critiquesof Legal
Academia, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1745, 1749 (1989) (arguing that critical race scholars "fail to support
persuasively their claims of racial exclusion or that claims that legal academic scholars of color produce
a racially distinctive brand of valuable scholarship"). The author also takes issue with critical race
argumentation policies and "narrative premises." Id.; see also Daniel Subotnik, What's Wrong with
CriticalRace Theory?: Reopening the Casefor Middle Class Values, 7 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
681, 682 (1998) (offering a "broad-based evaluation of CRT... from outside the movement"). The
author purports to be "unwedded to both traditional and Postmodernist legal scholarship." Id.; see also
Lloyd Cohen, A Different Black Voice in Legal Scholarship, 37 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 301 (1992)
(analyzing the dispute presented by Randall Kennedy's article, supra,and the subsequent responses by
critical race scholars).
17. It is virtually a truism that racial discrimination and racism persist in the United States
despite a comprehensive civil rights legal framework and jurisprudence. See, e.g., SHELBY STEELE, THE
CONTENT OF OUR CHARACTER: A NEW VISION OF RACE IN AMERICA (1990) (attempting to search out

the human universals that explain racial specifics); DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE
ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIALJUSTICE (1987) (analyzing racism and the legal barriers to racial justice).
Law reviews and other scholarly journals reflect a rich debate on racial issues, and some of this is
reflected in the popular media, although not always productively or constructively. See Margaret M.
Russell, Race and the DominantGaze: Narrativesof Law and Inequality in PopularFilm, 15 LEGAL
STUD. F. 243 (199 1) (analyzing the racial content of various films).
18. See NELSON MANDELA, THE STRUGGLE IS MY LIFE (1978) (describing the philosopy of
Nelson Mandela); TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS 1954-63

(1988) (describing the philosophy of Martin Luther King, Jr.).
19. See, e.g., FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: READINGS IN LAW AND GENDER (Katharine T. Bartlett
& Rosanne Kennedy eds., 1991) (a collection of feminist legal scholarship); HUMAN RIGHTS OF
WOMEN: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES (Rebecca J. Cook ed., 1994) (a collection of
articles on the human rights of women).

20.

See Maria Nzomo, Women and Democratization Struggles in Africa, in FEMINISM/

POSTMODERNISMIDEVELOPMENT 131 (Marianne H. Marchard & Jane L. Parpart eds., 1995)
(questioning the utility of postmodernism for the feminist movement in Kenya); see also Celina
Romany, Ain't la Feminist,4 YALEJ.L. &FEMINISM 23 (1991) (questioning postmodemism's potential
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The reader may have some curiosity as to how an analysis of Aboriginal
women comports with one of black South African women. In other words, how
did I come to focus on these two communities? There are two broad reasons for
doing so. The first is a practical or experiential one. Even though I am South
African by birth, I have lived and taught law in Australia for several years and
in the process became an Australian citizen. On many occasions while living
in Australia, I traveled to Aboriginal communities where I attended meetings
and conducted some research. I also taught courses on Australia's laws and
policies with respect to indigenous peoples and Australia's equal opportunity
laws and policies.22 The second reason is a theoretical one, which raises issues
and links the colonial experience in both societies to the legacy of violence with
respect to women. In both societies, the legacy of racism, dispossession and
alienation has ensured that black women are trapped in a spiral of poverty and
violence. In a previous paper I had explained, using anthropological and other
research, the multiple causes of violence with respect to the Australian
Aboriginal experience.23 The causes are many, but as in the situation in South
Africa, a combination of colonial attitudes and patriarchal practices within
Aboriginal communities account for much of the violence.2 4 Although there
were similarities in colonial attitudes towards issues like miscegenation, land
tenure and freedom of movement, there were significant differences in the
colonial experiences of black South Africans and Aboriginal Australians. For
example, the process of dispossession of Aboriginal land and annihilation of
the Aboriginal population was particularly brutal. Aboriginal labor was never
needed in Australia, so destroying whole communities and confiscating their
land was accepted practice (if not always official policy). 2
for fundamental social change).

21.

See generally supranote 15.

22. My own experience growing up in South Africa often resonated with what I witnessed. I
grew up classified as a "coloured" (mixed race) South African, a racial identity often typified by
contradiction and confusion. For an interesting discussion of the formation and perpetuation of a
"coloured" identity, see BREYTEN BREYTENBACH, DOG HEART: A MEMOIR 9 (1999) (discussing the
twilight political world of South Africa's mixed-race population).
23.

See Andrews, supranote 4, at 925-29.

24. See Andrews, supra note 3, at 437.
25.

See CHRIS CUNNEEN &TERRYLIBESMAN, INDIGENOUS PEOPLEANDTHELAW IN AUSTRALIA

11, 13 (1995); see also AUNTY IRIs LOvETT-GARDINER, LADY OFTHE LAKE: AUNTY IRIS'S STORY 17
(1997). There is some controversy in the literature about the extent of official authorization (as opposed
to condemnation or ignorance) of displacement of Aboriginal communities and/or massacres. For
example, some evidence suggests that the first occupiers carried strict instructions from the British
Crown about their first contact with the local people:
You are likewise to observe the genius, temper, disposition and number of the natives,
if there be any, and endeavour by all proper means to cultivate a friendship and alliance with
them .... [S]h[o]wing them every kind of civility and regard .... You are also with the
consent of the natives to take possession of convenient situations in the country in the name
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My final explanation relates to the question of gender equality and global
approaches. In order to analyze the existence and causes of inequality, local
conditions need to be scrutinized. The peculiarities of each country, premised
on its history, geography, culture and economic status, demand that the local
inquiry is the preeminent one. In other words, both the investigation of gender
equality and an appropriate response requires that we focus on local conditions.
However, engagement with the global, and particularly international human
rights law, necessarily entails sweeping with a general brush. The widespread
coincidence of the experiences of women, whether through violence or other
forms of gender oppression, necessarily makes that general brush appropriate,
certainly as a theoretical matter.26
The purpose of this article is to ascertain how the local can engage with the
global, and vice-versa, not just as a rhetorical device, but as a shared venture
to stem violence against women. 27 The situation and experience of black
women in South Africa and Aboriginal women in Australia are utilized because
they illustrate the intersectionality of race, gender, culture and poverty with
violence. They also highlight law's epistemological limitations in stemming
violence against women.
This paper is divided into three sections. Section one analyzes the
incidence of violence against women in South Africa and Australia. The
analysis includes a focus on legal strategies aimed at stemming such violence
and their possibilities for doing so. Section two highlights issues with respect
to globalization and particularly the impact of the contemporary global
economic configuration on women. This section also describes some successes,
at the formal level, of feminist interventions with respect to violence against
women. The purpose of this section is to connect violence against women, and
the ability to stem such violence, to unequal access to resources both at the
local and at the global level. Section three analyzes the specific contribution
that a critical race feminist perspective might bring to this ongoing debate and
the policy and practical implications of such contribution.

of the King of Great Britain ....
J.M. BENNET & ALEX C. CASTLES, A SOURCEBOOK OF AUSTRALIAN LEGAL HISTORY 253-54 (1979).

However, there is every indication that no consent was either sought or obtained from the Aborigines
before their land was seized. Id. at 177.
26. For a thoughtful discussion on the implications of global feminist initiatives for local
organization, see L. Amede Obiora, Feminism, Globialization,and Culture:After Beijing, 4 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 355 (1997).

27. In this regard, it may be appropriate to invoke Richard Falk's view of globalization and
human rights, namely, "globalization-from-below," which locates political participation at the local
level as the key factor in building and "strengthening over time.., global civil society." Richard Falk,
The Making of Global Citizenship, in GLOBAL VISIONS: BEYOND THE NEW WORLD ORDER 39, 39

(Jeremy Brecher et al. eds., 1993).
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II. VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN SOUTH AFRICA AND ABORIGINAL WOMEN

IN AUSTRALIA

A. South Africa
In South Africa violence against women generally defies racial, class and
geographical boundaries. However, even a cursory examination of the alarming
statistics reveals that it is poor, largely black women, who bear the brunt of
these consequences. 28 In a country where race and class continue to coincide,
harsh socio-economic realities bear heavily on black women.29 They have to
depend on public transport and its attendant unsafe conditions; they have to
walk miles to and from train and bus stops increasing the likelihood of attacks;
they have to sleep on sidewalks or at railway stations rendering them even more
vulnerable to assaults.3 °
In the domestic sphere as well, violence against women remains at
alarming levels.3 The situation is so severe that a large number of women have
come to view violence as "normal and inevitable. ' 32 The situation has been
exacerbated by the fact that for so long domestic violence was largely hidden
because abused women did not seek help from the authorities, but rather from
close family and friends.33 In 1998, the South African government responded34
to artful lobbying by women activists and passed the Domestic Violence Act.
This act is a comprehensive blueprint for eradicating domestic violence. Its farreaching definitions extend beyond the traditional heterosexual live-in
relationship to include homosexual and other intimate relationships. 35 Its elastic

28.

The number of rapes in South Africa between 1983 and 1994 have more than doubled, from

15,342, to 32,107. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCHIAFRicA & HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WOMEN'S RIGHTS

PROJECT, supranote 1, at 50 (citing SOUTH AFRICAN INlTruTE OFRACE RELATIONS, RACE RELATIONS
SURVEY 1993/94, at 299 (1994)).
29. See id. at 53.
30.

Id.

31.

Seeid. at45.

32.

Id. at 47.

33.

Id.

34. Domestic Violence Bill, 1998, Bill 116 (GG).
35.

Id. § l(vii):

"[D]omestic relationship" means a relationship between a complainant and a respondent in
any of the following ways:
(a) they are or were married to each other, including marriage according to any law,
custom or religion;
(b) they (whether they are of the same or of the opposite sex) live or lived together in a
relationship in the nature of marriage, although they are not, or were not, married to
each other, or are not able to be married to each other;
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definition of victim stretches to include family members other than spouses. 36
Its extensive definition of domestic violence recognizes the plethora of abuses
to which batterers subject their victims." Most significantly, the Act imposes
on police officers, peace officers, court officers and the other actors in the legal
system the duty to engage in a series of activities to protect the complainant.
These include the duty to inform a complainant of her rights under the
statute 38 and the duty of a peace officer to arrest an abuser without a warrant "at
the scene of an incident of domestic violence" upon reasonable suspicion that
the abuser has committed an act of domestic violence against the complainant.3
The Act also obligates the abuser to provide for rent or mortgage payments or
other emergency monetary relief.4" The Act makes provision for the protection
of the complainant's privacy by restrictions at hearings, as well as restrictions
on the publication of certain information connected therewith.4
These few examples from the Act represent symbolically and substantively
the determination of the South African government to eradicate domestic
violence. There have been other official responses as well. A particularly
significant one has been the judiciary's decisive intervention to deal with the
alarming statistics of rape of women and girls. In 1998 the highest court in
South Africa discarded the cautionary rule in rape cases, an evidentiary

(c)

they are the parents of a child or are persons who have or had parental responsibility
for that child (whether or not at the same time);
(d) they are family members related by consanguinity, affinity or adoption;
(e) they are or were in an engagement, dating or customary relationship, including an
actual or perceived romantic, intimate or sexual relationship of any duration; or
(f) they share or recently shared the same residence
36. Id. § l(vii)(c)-(d).
37. Id. § l(viii). The Act provides a comprehensive definition of domestic violence, which
includes physical abuse, stalking, and damage to property. Id. § I(viii)(a), (g), (h). The definition also
includes economic abuse, as well as emotional, verbal and psychological abuse, and harassment. Id. §
l(viii)(c), (d), (f).
38.

Domestic Violence Bill, 1998, Bill 116 (GG), § l(vii).

39. Id. § 3. If the abused spouse is unable to apply for a protection order, the Act makes a
provision for a counselor, social worker, teacher or other individual to make the application on her
behalf. Id. § 4(3). The Act provides for the issuance of an interim protection order where the court is
satisfied that there is evidence that an act of domestic violence has occurred, or that "undue hardship"
would result if a protection order is not issued immediately. Id. § 5(2)(a)-(b). Such an interim order will
be rendered permanent if the abuser does not respond with the time period prescribed by the Act, or if
after a hearing attended by the abuser, the court is satisfied that "on a balance of probabilities, that the
respondent has committed or is committing an act of domestic violence." Id. § 6(4). The Act provides
for sweeping measures in the protection order to curb the incidence of domestic violence, including a
prohibition on the abuser from entering the victim's residence or place of employment. Id. § 7(l)(a)-(h).
40.

Domestic Violence Bill, 1998, Bill 116 (GG), § 7(3)-(4).

41.

Id. § Ill)(a).
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impediment which made rape convictions very difficult to obtain.42 However,
it is trite that legal enforcement does not always follow legislative or judicial
pronouncements, and women activists will have to be consistently vigilant to
ensure that the provisions in statutes are enforced. But this comprehensive legal
response to violence is implicated in the larger question about the law's
epistemological boundaries in the face of deeply entrenched patriarchal and
sexist attitudes.43
B. Australia
Violence against Aboriginal women in Australia has reached such startling
proportions that it constitutes a violation of their human rights.44 The particular
forms of violence that Aboriginal women experience come from both public
and private actors. A 1991 Report on Racist Violence in Australia revealed
evidence of widespread sexual abuse of Aboriginal women at the hands of
police officers. 45 The evidence included the rape of very young girls at police
stations, who were too traumatized or too fearful to lodge complaints. 46 The
abuse, however, was not confined to women in custody. Some testified of a
police practice in one town of detaining Aboriginal women patrons at a bar and
then offering them to white male patrons for sex.47
By far the most devastating violence against Aboriginal women emanates
from "private violence," shown by the homicide, rape and assault statistics. The
fact that these statistics have only recently begun to receive attention is equally
disturbing.4 8 These sources indicate that Aboriginal women are at far greater
risk of being the victims of homicide, rape and other assaults than nonAboriginal women.49
The causes of violence against Aboriginal women are complex, and the
research suggests a combination of factors. The first factor is the system of

42. "This rule has its origins in a cultural prejudice that women habitually lie about rape, and
that to protect the due process rights of the accused, the state requires evidence to corroborate the rape
victim's testimony." Andrews, supra note 3, at 454.
43. See id.at456; see generally CATHERINEMAcKINNON, TOWARDAFEMINISTTHEORYOFTHE
STATE (1989) (analyzing the significance of gender inequality in knowledge and politics).
44.

See Andrews, supra note 4, at 917; see also Bell, supra note 6, at 221.

45.

HUMAN RIGHTS & EQUAL OPPORTUNTY COMM'N, supra note 2, at 79-114.

46.

Id. at 89.

47. Id. at 88.
48. SeeBell, supranote6, at238; AUSTRALIANLAw REFORM COMM'N, EQUALITY BEFORETHE
LAW 91-93, 138-41 (1993) (discussing statistics on the nature and the extent of violence in domestic
relationships and proposals to combat such violence).
49.

See BOLGER, supra note 6, at 35.
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sexual subordination which exists in traditional Aboriginal society and which
is buttressed in the wider Australian society." The second factor is the
breakdown of traditional social control due to the imposition of foreign
influences and societal structures. 5' A third factor is the appalling socioeconomic conditions in which many Aborigines find themselves.5 Another
devastating factor is the abuse of alcohol in many communities. 3
"The problem of violence against Aboriginal women therefore incorporates
an array of factors: race, gender, the after effects of colonialism, the minority
status of Aboriginal people and the unequal access to societal resources." 54 All
of these factors intersect to render Aboriginal women particularly vulnerable
to violence. These policies and consequences, integral to the colonial
administration of indigenous peoples, have wreaked havoc on individual
Aboriginal lives and have destroyed whole communities. However, Aboriginal
communities and their supporters have subsequently embarked on concerted
campaigns for redress, compensation and an official apology.5 5 None of these
have yet been forthcoming.
In both South Africa and Australia, the incidence of violence is connected
to the socio-economic realities that impact the lives of some black women.
Moreover, the ability of the law to temper or even eradicate violence is
compromised continuously by the contradictions between law's epistemological
boundaries and cultural attitudes buffeted by social and economic
arrangements 6 Official steps to eradicate violence therefore need to engage
with mechanisms other than law to confront such reality. In short, the law's
epistemological paradigms have to incorporate the economic powerlessness
which generate the violence.

50.

See Bell, supra note 6, at 226.

51.

See DIANE BELL & PAMELA DrrroN, LAW: THE OLD AND THE NEW: ABORIGINAL WOMEN

INCENTRAL AUSTRALIA SPEAK OUT 7 (1980).
52.

See PHYLISS DAYLIGHT & MARY JOHNSTONE, WOMEN'S BUSINESS: REPORT OF THE

ABORIGINALWOMEN'S TASK FORCE 22 (1986) (quoting Editorial, AGE, Sept. 3, 1985). The 1988-1989
Annual Report of the Department of Aboriginal Affairs places the number of Aborigines and Torres
Strait Islanders at 227,638 or 1.46% of the total Australian population. See H. MCRAE Er AL.,
ABORIGINAL LEGAL ISSUES: COMMENTARY AND MATERIALS 33 (1991). "The life expectancy of

Aborigines is approximately 20 years less than that for all Australians." Id. at 34. The imprisonment
rate of Aborigines is estimated to be 16 to 20 times than that for the non-Aboriginal population. See id.
at 35.
53.

See BOLGER, supra note 6, at 45.

54.

Andrews, supranote 4, at 918.

55. See, e.g., Ron Merkel, A Paper on Legal Options for Aborigines "Taken" from Their
Families and Their People 7-8 (Oct. 1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
56.
note 43.

For a comprehensive and controversial discussion of these issues, see MACKINNON, supra
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M. GLOBALIZATION

AND FEMINIST INTERVENTION

In light of these comments, and building on the theme of colonialism and
its legacy with respect to black women, in the following section I would like to
consider the relevant developments in globalization. Specifically, I will address
the engagement of women with globalization and vice versa.
57
A. Our GlobalNeighborhood?:The Phenomenon of Globalization

Some scholars have raised the question whether globalization is a new
phenomenon, or whether it is just imperialism or modernization with a new
label. 8 It is beyond the scope of this paper to explore these fascinating
questions; they continue to be debated by scholars across many disciplines. 9
For our purposes, the significance of the phenomenon of globalization rests in
its relationship to international human rights law, and more specifically, what
such relationship signals for women.
Today the language of universal human rights is accepted, if not always in
substance, at least as symbolic of global cooperation and consensus? ° The
proliferation of United Nations treaties, conventions and declarations reflect

57. "Globalization" can be described as "the process through which forces and actors that
transcend national boundaries shape life and law within nations." See Susan H. Williams,
Globalization,Privatizationand a Feminist Public,4 IND. J. LEGAL STUD. 97, 97 (1996) (footnote
omitted); see also Robert McCorquodale with Richard Fairbrother, Globalizationand Human Rights,
21 HUMAN RTs. Q. 735, 736 (1999) (considering contemporary globalization in its most general sense
as a form of institutionalization of the two-fold process involving the universalization of particularism
and the particularization of universalism).
58. See Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Towarda MulticulturalConception of Human Rights, 1
ZErrsCHRiFr FUR REcHTsSOzTOLOGIE 1, 1 (1997).
59. A small sample of this debate includes: BENJAMINR. BARBER, JIHAD VS. McWORLD (1995);
THE NEW GLOBALUSM AND DEVELOPING CouNTRIEs (John H. Dunning & Khilil A. Hamdini eds.,
1997).
60. This is a rather generalized point because the global human rights endeavor is fraught with
conflict and contradiction. Some of these debates, though important, have become standard fare for
human rights scholars and advocates, such as the debate surrounding universalism and cultural
relativism. See Jack Donnelly, CulturalRelativismand UniversalHuman Rights, 6 HUMAN RTS. Q. 400
(1984) (arguing that there should be a fundamental universality of basic human rights, tempered by a
recognition of the possible need for limited cultural variations); see also Dianne Otto, Rethinking the
"Universality" ofHuman Rights Law, 29 COL. HuM. RTS. L. REV. 1 (1997) (examining the universality
of human rights law); Karen Engle, Female Subjects of PublicInternationalLaw: Human Rights and
the Exotic Other Female,26 NEw ENG. L. REV. 1509 (1992) (discussing the practice and culture of
clitoridectomy in human rights law); Maxwell 0. Chibundu, Making Customary InternationalLaw
ThroughMunicipalAdjudication:AStructuralEnquiry, 39 VA. J. INT'LL. 1069 (1999) (discussing the
enforcement of human rights law globally).
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this new world order of rights.61 The celebration of fifty years of "global

governance" in 1995 and the much heralded report on global governance reflect
an optimistic and confident global arrangement and the supposed global
arrangement of shared values.62

In fact, Boaventura de Sousa Santos has commented on the primacy of
human rights as "the language of progressive politics," confidently providing
an "emancipatory script" for those seeking redress from unjust and abusive
regimes.63 Upendra Baxi refers to the discourse of human rights seeking to
"supplant all other ethical languages.'6 4 Of course this optimistic edifice masks
a more sinister period in world history, one typified not by international strife,
but by intra-national conflicts which have devastated millions of lives in the last
few decades.65 In these conflicts, whole communities fare dismally, but women
and children continue to be the most vulnerable and have experienced particular
injury based on their gender. 66 For them, the international human rights
framework exists as a distant, arcane construct.
The Report of the Commission on Global Governance enunciates "people's
right to security." 67 The Report highlights the disturbing fact that the "Third
World continues to be the primary purchaser of arms."6' An anomaly exists in
simultaneously "spending for war" and "spending for peace."6 9 For example,
the Democratic Republic of Congo spends $9.70 per head on defense, while

61. See, e.g.. G.A. Res. 34/180, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 193, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1979) [hereinafter
CEDAW] (entered into force September 3, 1981); International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination, U.N. GAOR, 33d Sess., Supp. No. 18, at 108, U.N. Doc. A/33/18
(1978) (entered into force on January 4, 1969).
62.
(1995).
63.

See OuRGLOBALNEIGHBORHOOD, REPORTONTHECOMMISSIONONGLOBALGOVERNANCE
de Sousa Santos, supra note 58, at I.

64. Upendra Baxi, Voices of Suffering, Fragmented Universality and the Future of Human
Rights 1 (1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author.)
65. See CLIVEPONTING, PROGRESSANDBARBARISM: THEWORLDINTHETWENTIE1H CENTURY
( 998) (discussing the evolution of the world during the twentieth century); see also J. Oloka-Onyango,
The Plightof the LargerHalf-Human Rights, Gender Violence and the Legal Status of Refugee and
Internally Displaced Women in Africa, 24 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 349 (1996) (arguing that
international law is oblivious to the overall situation of women).
66. See generally Dianne Otto, Whose Security? Re-Imagining Post-ColdWar Peacekeeping
from a Feminist Perspective,in SECURITY IN APOST-CoLD WAR WORLD 65 (Robert G. Patman ed.,
1999) (discussing the position of women in the post-Cold War world).
67.

OUR GLOBAL NEIGHBORHOOD, supranote 62, at 71.

68.

Id. at 127.

69. Upendra Baxi, "Global Neighborhood" and the "Universal Otherhood": Notes on the
Report of the Commission on Global Governance,21 ALTERNATIVS 525,526 (1996).
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spending a mere $.40 per head per year on health care.7 ° The situation in
Tanzania is only slightly better. There the government spends $4.00 per head
on defense, while spending $.70 per head on health care.7'
Global governance and its attendant exhortation of certain values, though
laudable, is elusive for several reasons. One significant reason is that global
governance is premised on the myth of the sovereign equality of states.72 In
other words, the formal structure of international law and governance embraces
the notion that sovereign states are politically equal. It has been eloquently
argued that this formal edifice essentially masks not just the de facto economic
inequality of states, but obscures the fact that many states have bartered their
"political" sovereignty to secure certain economic benefits.73 This was the
reality during the Cold War era when the existence of the two powerful
ideological blocks effectively corroded any semblance of political autonomy on
the part of developing countries. These countries, all in the Third World, were
conscripted into one or the other ideological camp with economic and other
benefits as incentives for loyalty.74
Although the economic status quo contradicts any notion of the sovereign
equality of states, the operation of the United Nations Security Council
exemplifies this contradiction. Five countries essentially have a veto on
decisions made by the General Assembly consisting of 150 plus member
states!75 And therein lies the rub; the United Nations, with its elaborate
bureaucracy and its voluminous collection of declarations and resolutions of
equality, masks the inherent disparity between the powerful West and the rest
of the world.76 International human rights law essentially exists at the margins
of governance. This is not to deny the importance of the role of the United
Nations or its herculean efforts at redressing injustices however and wherever
they may surface. The point is not to undermine the importance, both
symbolically and substantively, of the range of human rights instruments which

70.

See Kari Nielsen, Is Global JusticeImpossible?, 4 RES PUBLICA 131, 138 (1998).

71.

Id.

72. See Maxwell Chibundu, Affirmative Action and InternationalLaw, in GLOBAL ISSUES IN
COMPENSATORY JUSTICE 11, 11 (Penelope E. Andrews ed., 1999).
73. Id.; see also generally R.H. JACKSON, QUASI-STATES: SOVEREIGNTY, INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS AND THE THIRD WORLD (1991) (questioning state sovereignty in the Third World).
74.

Chibundu, supranote 72, at 13.

75. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2; see also Diane Otto, Challenging the "New World Order":
InternationalLaw,GlobalDemocracyandthe PossibilitiesforWomen, 3 TRANSNAT'LL. &CONTEMP.
PROBS. 371, 376 (1993).
76. See Kenneth Anderson, SecularEschatologiesand ClassInterests,in RELIGION AND HUMAN
RIGHTS: COMPETING CLAIMS 107, 115 (Carrie Gustafson & Peter Juviler eds., 1999) (arguing that the
rhetoric of human rights obscures the domination of the global elite, who use the language of rights to
justify their domination).
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exhort national leaders to appropriate practices (if not higher ideals) and which
provide great sustenance symbolically and materially for local and global
activists. My rather simplistic observation is that given the disparity in
notion of equality of states distorts the global
economic resources globally, the
77
reality.
political
and
economic
The specter of globalization has spawned three issues which bear directly
on women's human rights. The first issue is the issue of sovereignty, and more
specifically, the regulatory capacities of the nation state."8 The second issue is
the globalization of law or what has been termed the "judicialization of
politics."79 The third issue is the hegemony of human rights as the language of
struggle. °
B. Hierarchiesof Human Rights
In many ways the divide between civil and political rights on the one hand,
and economic, social and cultural rights on the other, is an artifact of the Cold
War era."' The consequences of this divide, not just in ideological terms, but
material ones, are now well known. But despite the demise of the Cold War era,
this primacy of individual rights is reflected in not just the contemporary global
economic arrangements, but in the dominant discourse and structures of politics
and law.
Contemporary political discourse reflects the hegemony of liberal
democracy as the dominant political paradigm82 This paradigm is imbued with
its own version of legal formalism, one predicated on constitutionalism and the
rule of law. Boaventura de Sousa Santos has referred to the "judicialization of
politics," the idea that legal institutions and processes of conflict resolution, or
ordering of societal relationships, are now hegemonicY Its most profound

77. This simple point is significant because of its bearing on human rights and practice: the body
of human rights law, however detailed and substantial, cannot be effective in the face of massive
inequalities which circumscribe choices for people. See generally Russell Lawrence Barsh, A Special
Session of the UN GeneralAssembly Rethinks the Economic Rights and Duties of States, 85 AM. J.
INT'L L. 192 (1991) (discussing the 18th special assembly of the U.N. General Assembly).
78. See SASKIA SASSEN, LOSING CONTROL?: SOVEREIGNTY INAN AGE OF GLOBALIZATION xiixiv (1996).
79. Boaventura de Sousa Santos, The Gatt of Law and Democracy: (Mis)Trusting the Global
Refon of Courts, in GLOBALIZATION AND LEGAL CULTURES 49, 52 (J. Feest ed., 1999).
80.

See supra note 60.

81. See John P. Pace, The Developmentof Human Rights Law in the UnitedNations,Its Control
and Monitoring Machinery, 50 INT'L SOC. Sc. J. 499, 500 (1998).
82. See Sharon K. Hom, InternationalLawMoves in a Cross-DisciplineRegister,92 A. Soc'Y
INT'LL. PROC. 99, 100 (1998).
83.

de Sousa Santos, supra note 79, at 52.
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manifestation is the primacy of constitutions or the idea of constitutional

governance."
South Africa exhibits the most recent reflection of this tendency; arguably
the revolution there was largely a legal one.85 The most influential processes
prior to the elections there in 1994 were the constitutional negotiations.86 It was
the pens of lawyers that gave the nation its new legal and political order, albeit
at the behest of politicians who brokered the substance of the final documents. 87
The proliferation of quasi-legal and legal regulatory agencies and human rights
bodies, specifically to administer and enforce the new dispensation of human
rights, reflects the bureaucratization of human rights enforcement and its
legalistic culture.88
This strategic maneuver to channel political aspirations and conflict
resolution through the prism of the law is overall laudatory. But what this legal
edifice obscures are underlying economic and social inequalities which fall
outside the confines of legal solutions. 89 They need to be addressed through the
processes of political and economic enfranchisement leading to those extra
legal processes which empower people, not just every four years at the ballot
box, but every day in the ordinary encounters of their lives. 9°

84. See generally DANIELJ.ELAZAR, CONSrrUTIONALIZNGGLOBALIZATION (1998) (discussing
the role of constitutions in the process of globalization).
85. See generallySIRIGLOPPEN, SouTHAFRIcA: THEBATTLEOVERTHECONSTITUTION (1997)
(discussing the connection between the revolution and the constitution).
86.

Id. at 199-276.

87. See Doreen Atkinson, Brokering a Miracle?:The Multiparty NegotiatingForum, in THE
SMALL MIRACLE: SOUTH AFRICA'S NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT 12 (Steven Friedman ed., 1994)
(discussing the drafting of South Africa's Constitution).
88. I am not suggesting that this is overall not a good thing. South Africans recognized at the
outset that the excesses of apartheid masquerading under the guise of parliamentary supremacy, as well
as the rampant lawlessness typified by the security police during the 1980s, needed to be unequivocally
reversed. See JOHN DUGARD, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL ORDER 14-36 (1978);
see also THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMM'N OF SOUTH AFRICA, THE FINAL REPORT (1998)
(reporting the Commission's findings on apartheid). In addition, the incorporation of rights in the
Constitutions (both the interim and final ones) required effective enforcement mechanisms.
89. See Benjamin R. Barber, GlobalDemocracy orGlobal Law: Which Comes First,l GLOBAL
LEGAL STUD. J. 119, 121 (1993).
90. In fact, it has been argued that the hegemony of neoliberalism, with its trappings of the
liberal state, has deleterious consequences for social and economic rights.
[The new globalizing ideology of neoliberalism and the dismantling of social guarantees
afforded by the welfare state, on behalf ofeconomic efficiency, have set the tone for an overevaluation of the individualistic homo-economicus, with the correlate phenomena of
exclusion and social dislocation.
J. A. Lindgren Alves, Commemorative Essay: On the 50th Anniversary of the UniversalDeclaration
of Human Rights, the UnitedNations, Pastmodernity,and Human Rights, 32 U.S.F. L. REv. 479,486
(1998).
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Not to be cavalier about the significance of the codification of rights,9' but
the formal edifice often obscures the underlying structural dimensions which
law cannot cure. For example, in the United States, where civil and political
rights enjoy constitutional primacy, the right to vote remains hollow. A huge
proportion of the population, disproportionately people of color, have
effectively disregarded the formal electoral process, which is seen as having no
validity to their lives.92

For critical race feminists, the challenge is marrying substance and
symbolism and refusing to reinforce a lopsided view of rights which sacrifices
socio-economic rights to the primacy of political and civil rights.93 Traditional
gendered analysis often failed to see the epistemological and experiential
connections with other subordinated groups, for example, the poor or racial
minorities.94 Moreover, even though within those groups women largely fare
worst, this is not always so. For example, in certain societies generational
benefits accrue and women are sometimes implicated in gender oppression.95
In short, the quest for women's rights often involves a fraught negotiation
between class and culture and how each implicates men and women as
perpetrators of human rights violations.96 This focus appreciates the condition

91.

See WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE, supra note 9, at 164. As Williams notes so

elegantly: "Rights' feel new in the mouths of most black [and other oppressed] people. It is still
The concept of rights, both positive and negative, is the marker of
deliciously empowering ....
citizenship, our relation to others." Id.
92. See Richard L Ergstrom, Minority Electoral Opportunities and Alternative Election
Systems in the UnitedStates, in VOTING RIGHTS AND REDISTRICTING INTHE UNITED STATES 227, 22743 (Mark E. Rush ed., 1998) (discussing a cumulative voting system that would better represent a
minority vote).
93. I am not for a moment suggesting here that feminists and other critical scholars have not
addressed this issue comprehensively. See generally Kathleen Mahoney, TheoreticalPerspectiveson
Women's Human Rights and Strategiesfor Their Implementation, 21 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 799 (1996)
(discussing theories of feminism and their practical application in international law). But the
contemporary configuration of global politics and economics demands vigilance by women activists
to address economic disadvantages which continues to contribute to women's subordination.
94. See ELIZABETH V. SPELMAN, INESSENTIALWOMAN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION IN FEMINIST
THOUGHT 114-15 (1988).
95.

An example is the issue ofsati (women flinging themselves on their husband's funeral pyre).

See Radhika Coomaraswamy, To Bellow Like a Cow: Women, Ethnicity,and the Discourse ofRights,
in HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 19, at 39,
48-50. Coomaraswamy's analysis incorporates the culpability of both men and women in reinforcing
cultural and familial imperatives for a practice that literally kills women. Id. at 48-54.
96. It is not sufficient to reference only false consciousness as the culprit; these attitudes and
practices are steeped in any society's history and concomitant sense of shared values. See Jill Krause,
Gender Inequalitiesand FeministPoliticsin a GlobalPerspective,in GLOBALIZATION: THEORY AND
PRACTICE 224, 232, 234 (Eleonore Kofman & Gillian Youngs eds., 1996); Valentine V. Moghadam,
Introduction:Women and Identiy Politicsin Theoreticaland ComparativePerspective,in IDENTITY
POLITICS AND WOMEN: CULTURAL REASSERTIONS AND FEMINISMS IN INTERNATIONALPERSPECTIVE

(1994).
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of powerlessness of whole communities, including men, in the continuing
economic disenfranchisement of the developing world, albeit with the
concurrence and acquiescence of local elites.97 Specifically, a traditional rightsbased approach situates the state as the major provider of those rights, the
conduit through which claims are made. But the limitations posed by the
demands of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank on these
countries to restructure their economies severely constrain the ability of states
to do much, with deleterious consequences for economically marginalized
groups, particularly women.98
C. Women and Globalization

What does the contemporary era of globalization mean for women? In
other words, what does "globalization look like when viewed through the 'lens'
of gender." 99 All the evidence suggests that globalization has merely cemented

women's unequal economic status.°° A perusal of the economic arena suggests
that most women in the developing world experience globalization through the
"structural adjustment" imperatives imposed by the financial regulatory agents
of globalization, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund."'0 For
women, the processes of structural adjustment merely reinforce their
subordinate status within the national labor force and other economic
indicators. 0 2

97. See, e.g., J. Oloka-Onyango, Beyond the Rhetoric: Reinvigorating the Struggle for
Economic and Social Rights in Africa, 26 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 1 (1995) (analyzing economic and social
human rights in specific relation to the African continent); Susan Demske, Trade Liberalization:De
FactoNeocolonialism in East Africa, 86 GEO. L.J. 155 (1997) (arguing that equalizing trade barriers
indiscriminately has the effect of discriminating against those countries that do not begin on the same
playing field).
98. See Mahoney, supra note 93, at 852-53 (stating that "[s]tructural adjustment programs
imposed by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank have caused disproportionate
disadvantage to women because their theories, strategies, and solutions for development, growth and
underdevelopment tend to ignore women and the role they fulfill in their societies").
99.

See Krause, supra note 96, at 225.

100. See id.; see also Lucy B. Bednarek, The Gender Wage Gap: Searchingfor Equality in
Global Economy, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 213 (1998) (discussing the wage gap between men
and women).
101. See Akua Kuenyehia, The Impact of Structural Adjustment Programs on Women's
InternationalHuman Rights: The Example of Ghana, in HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN: NATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES, supranote 19, at 422, 423-26; Gracia Clark, Implicationsof Global
Polarizationfor Feminist Work, 4 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 43, 47 (1996).
102. See generally Bharati Sadasivam, The Impact of Structural Adjustment on Women: A
Governance and Human Rights Agenda, 19 HuM. RTS. Q. 630 (1997) (discussing the effects of
globalization on women).
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We have witnessed the now complete movement offshore of manufacturing
and other industries to cheap labor in marginal countries like Taiwan, Malaysia
and Guatemala. This movement is accompanied by a "race" to the bottom in the
developing world, for example, the least protective labor laws, and the lowest
wages. 3 A country's most favorable investment status, namely, its allure to
foreign investments, depends on the least protective labor standards, lowest
wages, most docile labor force and the least regulation." ° The twin processes
of privatization and restructuring results in government privatization of
essential services, as well as of its regulatory and administrative functions.' °5
The raison d'tre for structural adjustment and its offspring, privatization, is to
allow for the free flow of capital and to make recipient countries more attractive
to investors. In short, the cumulative consequences for workers and
economically marginalized groups is quite deleterious. For women this is
particularly so.1° 6 In 1989, the Report of a Commonwealth Expert Group of
Women observed as follows:
Women are at the epicentre of the crisis and bear the brunt of the
adjustment efforts: it is women who have been most severely affected
by the deteriorating balance between income and prices, and who have
desperately sought means for their families to survive. It is women
who have had to find extra work to supplement family income; it is
women who have rearranged family budgets ... and it is women who

have been most immediately affected by cuts in health and educational
facilities, and by the rising morbidity and deaths among their children.
Women are at the frontline of the crisis in the developing world-and
it is they who have been most severely affected and have had the
greatest responsibility for adjusting their lives to ensure survival.' °7
Structural Adjustment Programs therefore disproportionately impact women,
leaving them as a group particularly vulnerable.

103. See Williams, supranote 57, at 98.
104. See Susan George, The Debt Boomerang, in 50 YEARS Is ENOUGH:THE CASEAGAINSTTHE
WORLD BANK AND THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 29, 30-31 (Kevin Danaher ed., 1994).
105. Not all commentators see the phenomenon of globalization and its attendant market
liberalization as necessarily a negative thing. See, e.g., Pierre Sauve, Open Markets Matter,WORLD
COMPETION, June 1998, at 57, 57-72 (arguing the benefits of an open market).
106. See Sadasivam, supra note 102, at 632.
107. ENGENDERINGADJUSTMENTFORTHE 1990S: REPORT OFACOMMONWEALTH EXPERT GROUP

ON WOMEN AND STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT 31-32 (1989), quoted in Sadasivam, supra note 102, at
633.
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D. FeministInterventions in InternationalHuman Rights Discourse

Different critical theorists have tried to make sense of this "new"
arrangement.108 Some scholars have argued that this so-called new world order
is not really new, that it merely represents a postmodern package buttressed by
highly sophisticated information technology."' 9 Whatever perspective on the
debate we adhere to, it is arguable that this phase in human history differs from
earlier periods of colonialism and imperialism. Much of the difference can be
attributed to the new communication and information technology, and the
"end" of some of the familiar technology. 10 Other scholars have tried to show
how this new economic arrangement has led to greater global economic
inequality."' Feminist scholars have been particularly insightful at showing
how global economic forces institutionalize the subjugation of women through,
for example, labor
practices, reduction of state welfare services and growth in
2
the sex trade."

Feminist legal scholars have been adept at pointing out how the regulatory
field, international law and particularly the major regulatory body, the United
Nations, has failed women by consistently ignoring their needs through its
enforcement documents, procedures, enforcement mechanisms,
administration-in short the legal ideology of international law and the United
Nations and its umbrella organizations. 13 These critical scholars continue to
expose international law's patriarchal edifice. 4 They have barely penetrated
this vast edifice, but the urgency of gender equality has been given the formal
108. SeeJostDelbruck, GlobalizationofLaw, PoliticsandMarkets-mplicationsforDomestic
Law-A EuropeanPerspective, I IND. J. GLOBALLEGAL STUD. 9, 9 (1993).
109. See generally ROBERT SCHAFFER, UNDERSTANDING GLOBALIZATION: THE SOCIAL
CONSEQUENCES OFPoLmCAL, ECONOMIC AND ENViRONMENTALCHANGE (1997) (examining political,
economic, and environmental changes throughout the world during the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s with
a historical perspective).
110. Upendra Baxi, an Indian scholar, has rather amusingly referred to the fact that the prefix post
is essential in the discourse of the cognoscenti: post-modem, post-colonial, post-feminist. As we
approach the millennium, there are bold assertions of the end of much that has comforted us: the end
of history, the end of religion, the end of race. Upendra Baxi, The Unreason of Globalization and the
Reason of Human Rights 3 (1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
111. See generally Arthur MacEwan, Globalizationand Stagnation, 23 SOC. JUST. 49 (1996)
(arguing that globalization has resulted in stagnation for some).
112. See Williams, supranote 57, at 98.
113. See, e.g., Hilary Charlesworth et al., FeministApproaches to InternationalLaw, 85 AM. J.
INT'LL. 613 (1991) (questioning the immunity of international law to feminist analysis). For a helpful
bibliography on feminist readings or international law, see Rebecca J. Cook, Women's International
Human Rights: A Bibliography,24 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 857 (1992).
114. See, e.g., GLOBAL CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM: AN INTERNATIONAL READER (Adrien
Katherine Wing ed., forthcoming 2000); HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 19.
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nod in previously recalcitrant quarters; witness, for example, the Beijing
Conference and the Platform for Action," 5 the Vienna Conference' 16 that
preceded it, and the Population and Development Conference in Cairo." 7 One
can therefore argue the international law landscape for feminist activists
appears more amenable to change for women."'
Of course feminist debates have not occurred without conflict or
controversy. Western liberal assumptions implicit in much of feminist writing,
and its essentialist paradigm have been subjected to widespread analysis." 9
Women of color in the developed world and women in the developing world
have challenged these assumptions, and this process of debate and resultant
practice continues. However, despite these controversies, women activists
globally have energized the plethora of non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) which continue to proliferate. 20 The individual and combined efforts
and lobbying of these NGOs have forced governments to consider gender

115. Report of the Forth World Conference on Women: The Beijing Declaration and the
PlarformforAction,U.N. Doc. AICONF. 177/20 (1995). The document bolsters CEDAW, byproviding
a program of action for governments to address women's rights. See Margaret Plattner, The Status of
Women Under InternationalHuman Rights Law and the 1995 UN World Conference on Women,
Beijing, China, 84 KY. LJ. 1249,1254-60,1263-73 (1996) (discussing both CEDAW and the Beijing
Conference); Elizabeth L. Larson, Comment, United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women:
Actionfor Equalit, Development, and Peace (Beijing, China:September 1995), 10 EMORY INT'LL.
REv. 695 (1996) (discussing the Beijing Conference).
116. At this conference, feminists lobbied extensively in favor of the recognition that violence
against women is a violation of human rights. The conference culminated in the Declarationon the
Eliminationof Violence Against Women, G.A. Res. 104, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Agenda Item 111,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/104 (1993). See Donna J. Sullivan, Note, Women's Human Rights and the 1993
World Conferenceon Human Rights, 88 AM. J. INT'LL. 152, 152 (1994) (stating that "[tihe conference
crystallized a political consensus that various forms of violence against women should be examined
within the context of human rights standards and in conjunction with gender discrimination").
117. The 1994 International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo addressed,
among other topics, women's reproductive health issues. Feminists lobbied extensively to ensure that
the debate included women's perspectives, although individual women's perspectives differed in
relation to questions of birth control and particularly abortion. Rhonda Copelon, Sexual and
ReproductiveRights,inTHECONSTrTUTIONOFSOUTHAFRICAFROMAGENDER PERSPECrIVE 190,198-

201 (Sandra Liebenberg ed., 1995).
118. The many collections in the past decade exploring these issues bear testimony to this
burgeoning acceptance of women's rights as human rights. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN:
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONALPERSPECTIVES, supranote 19; OURS BY RIGHT: WOMEN'S RIGHTS AS

HUMAN RIGHTS (Joanne Kerr ed., 1993).
119. See, e.g., CRrIcAL RACE FEMINISM: A READER, supra note 7; GLOBAL CRITICAL RACE
FEMINISM: AN INTERNATIONAL READER, supra note 114.

120. See, e.g., Afra Afsharipour, Note, Empowering Ourselves: The Role of Women NGO's in
the Enforcement of the Women's Convention, 99 COLuM. L. REv. 129 (1999) (arguing that NGOs can
fill the enforcement gap).
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issues, and they have
"engendered" organs of civil society.' 2'Examples of such
2
abound.1
activism
Many of the goals demanded by women on the global level remain
aspirational. However, the script for women's emancipation and equality, no
longer written only by Western feminists peddling a brand of essentialist
politics, is now multi-authored. 23 In short, the trenchant claims of universalism
continue to be challenged and modified to accommodate competing visions of
124
human rights interpretation and enforcement.

E. Violence Against Women: GlobalStrategies

The universal need to eradicate violence against women is recognized not
just as a rhetorical tool, but it is also incorporated in the United Nations
Declaration. The most detailed document detailing rights to which women are
entitled is the Convention on the Elimination ofAll Forms of Discrimination

Against Women (CEDAW). 125 CEDAW provides a comprehensive legal
framework designed to ensure equality for women. 126 It outlines the major legal
and social structures that impede women's rights and opportunities. It also
specifies measures that state parties who ratify CEDAW must take to eliminate
127
such discriminatory structures.

121. See Dorothy Q. Thomas, Holding GovernmentsAccountable by PublicPressure,in OURS
BY RIGHT: WOMEN'S RIGHTS AS HUMAN RIGHTS, supranote 118, at 82, 82-88 (discussing the creation
of the Women's Rights Project at Human Rights Watch); see also Govind Kelkar, Stopping the
Violence Against Women: Fifo, Years of Activism in India, in FREEDOM FROM VIOLENCE: WOMEN'S
STRATEGIES FROM AROUND THE WORLD 75 (Margaret Schuler ed., 1992) (discussing violence against
women in India).
122. Note for example how women activists lobbied the major political parties during South
Africa's constitutional negotiations to ensure that the new constitution incorporate rights of gender
equality. See Penelope E. Andrews, Striking the Rock: Confronting GenderEqualitY in South Africa,
3 MICH. J. RACE & L. 307, 327-34 (1998); see also Coomaraswamy, supranote 95, at 39 (discussing
litigation brought by women in South East Asia to stem violence).
123. See Isabelle Gunning, ArrogantPerception,World TravellingandMulticulturalFeminism:
The Case of Female GenitalSurgeries,23 COLuM. HuM. RTS.L. REv. 189-248 (1992); see also Amede
Obiora, supra note 26, at 355 (questioning the interface of feminism and globalization with particular
reference to the implications for culture).
124. See Rosi Braidotti, The Exile, the Nomad, and the Migrant: Reflections on International
Feminism, 15 WOMEN'S STUD. INT'L F. 1, 7-10 (1992).
125. G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 193, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1979).
126 Id.
127. Id. at arts. 2-10.
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But it is the Vienna Declaration'28 which pushed the issue of violence
against women to the forefront of the struggle for women's human rights. In
1993, the United Nations at its World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna
recognized the specificity of women's rights as part of the international human
rights agenda.'29 The Vienna Declaration specifically identifies the "human
rights of women" as "an inalienable, integral and indivisible part of universal
human rights."' 3 The Declaration goes on to state that "the full and equal
participation of women in political, civil, economic, social and cultural life, at
the national, regional and international levels, and the eradication of all forms
of discrimination on the grounds of sex are priority objectives of the
international community."'' The Declaration also condemns "[g]ender-based
violence and all forms of sexual harassment and exploitation," 13 2 and calls upon
the General Assembly to "adopt a draft declaration on violence against
133
women."'

IV. VOICES FROM THE MARGINS' 3 4 : THE CONTRIBUTION OF A CRITICAL RACE

FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE

The issues bearing on the human rights of women have shifted slowly from
the margins to a more accessible place in human rights discourse.' 35 This shift,
at least in terms of the parameters of human rights discourse, has emanated

128. World Conference on Human Rights, The Vienna Declarationand Programmeof Action,
A/CONF. 157/24 (1993).
129. Il
130. Id. at art. 1(18).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at art. 11(38). This section also calls upon states to combat violence against women in
accordance with the United Nations' provisions and declares that "[v]iolations of the human rights of
women in situations of armed conflict are violations of the fundamental principles of international
human rights and humanitarian law." World Conference on Human Rights, The Vienna Declaration
and Programme of Action, supra note 128.
134. The term is used here to refer to economic and cultural margins, those locations not at the
center of economic activity; or those communities culturally marginalized and relegated to other
locations. See Chandra Mohanty, UnderWestern Eyes: Feminist Scholarshipand ColonialDiscourses,
FEMINIST REV., Autumn 1988, at 61, 61-65 (highlighting the experiences of women from the "Third
World" to counter western feminist notions of a monolithic "Third World Woman").
135. Women still remain the most disadvantaged globally, but there is at least a growing lobby
of women activists and scholars loudly pursuing women's rights. See supratext accompanying notes
120-22.
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from thoughtful, analytical interventions by feminist legal scholars.' 36 Their
most enduring insights have been attempts to excavate the absent voices of
women, either as part of the formal structures of the United Nations' system,
or in the context of international human rights law.3 7 They have also
challenged the so-called neutrality and objectivity of international law and have
demonstrated how the public/private dichotomy in international law serves to
reinforce formal structures that subjugate women.'38 Feminist scholars have
also recognized the multiplicity and intersectionality of factors like race and
ethnicity that impede women's rights.'39 All these perspectives have surely
enriched the analytical landscape for the human rights of women.
In light of these creative feminist analyses, what perspectives might a
critical race feminist approach bring to bear on the discourse of human rights
and especially the elimination of violence against women globally? Further,
what effective strategies could such an approach identify to combat such
violence? To put the question differently, what is the transformative potential
of critical race feminism?14 °
At its most basic level, critical race feminism needs to locate the origins of
violence against women beyond the individual pathologies reflected in intimate
domestic violence, rape, sexual harassment or other forms of sexual violence,
by locating such manifestations in the larger power imbalance between the

genders which perpetuate male hegemony.' 4' This inquiry requires excavating
the causes of violence and situating them within the larger socio-political and
economic context. Critical race feminists should examine physical violence in

136. See Rebecca Cook, Women's InternationalHuman Rights Law: The Way Forward, in
HUMAN RIGHTS OFWOMEN: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONALPERSPECTIVES, supranote 19, at 3,3-36.

137. See Karen Engle, InternationalHuman Rights and Feminism: When DiscoursesMeet, 13
MICH. J. INT'L L. 517, 518-21 (1992)

138. See Celina Romany, State Responsibility Goes Private: A Feminist Critique of the
Public/PrivateDistinction in InternationalHuman Rights Law, in HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN:
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECrIVES, supra note 19, at 85, 85.
139. Harris, supra note 11, at 585 (criticizing mainstream feminism for failing to take into
account the experiences of black women).
140. I refer to transformative feminism, one that addresses women's subordinated status by
referencing not just the actual experience of violence that women are subjected to, but one that
interrogates the causes and the consequences of violence, not just for the women involved, but the
society at large. See Hope Lewis, Lionheart Gals Facing the Dragon: The Human Rights of
Inter/NationalBlack Women in the UnitedStates,76 OR. L. REv. 567,625-26 (1997) (discussing some
of the challenges critical race feminism must confront).
141. Catherine MacKinnon has persuasively articulated the locus of violence against women by
referencing patriarchy which is predicated in violence. See CATHERINE MACKINNON, SEXUAL
HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 158 (1979). Rhonda Copelon
has called for a more expansive definition of violence against women as torture. See Rhonda Copelon,
Intimate Terror: Understanding Domestic Violence as Torture, in HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN:
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 19, at 116, 116-52.
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all its gross and vapid manifestations, but in the process it has to unbundle the
violence of poverty. Feminists have made impressive strides in forcing the
international community to recognize violence as a human rights issue.142 What
needs to occur is an interlinking of violence and economic opportunity or
status. In other words, critical race feminism can bring to the table an agenda
that locates violence within the wider structures of economic subordination and
oppression, both locally and globally. 43 A fellow traveler of critical race
feminism, Berta Herniudez-Truyol, has demonstrated the "inter-connectedness
of civil and political rights with social and economic rights."144 This connection
needs to be articulated at the local level, as well as on the global scale, where
impoverishment and disempowerment plague large communities. 4 5
Building on the body of feminist theory analyzing the universe of
international human rights law and its deficiencies with respect to women's
rights, critical race feminists could unmask the veneer of equality of states
which underpin international legal discourse. In this endeavor they will not be
alone; female scholars from the developing nations have articulated a vision of
human rights that recognizes the economic imperatives which skew political
options. 4 6 In other words, the formal ideology of international law-the
sovereign equality of states-is meaningless in the contemporary global
economic configuration. 4 7
Unbundling this de facto inequality is significant if one of the root causes
of violence, poverty, is to be attacked. 4 The reality of poverty implicates
women's rights and women's choices in several ways. One way is the ability
142. For a discussion of the Vienna Declaration, see supra text accompanying notes 128-33.
143. See, e.g., Lisa C. Ikemoto, Furtheringthe Inquiry:Race, Class,and Culture in the Forced
Medical Treatment of PregnantWomen, 59 TENN. L. REV. 487 (1992) (rejecting the subordinating
restrictions on reproductive choice).
144. Berta Esperanza Hemr.ndez-Truyol, Sex, Culture and Rights: A Re/Conceptualizationof
Violence for the Twenty-First Century, 60 ALB. L. REV. 607, 619 (1997).
145. These are not academic questions. Despite the "victory" of women's rights activists in
Vienna, see discussion of the Vienna Declaration, supra text accompanying notes 128-33, the issue
of violence is not regarded as the most important issue facing women, particularly in the poorer
countries of the globe. For many women in these societies, basic sustenance for them and their families
is the most they can hope for. The conditions of gross poverty distort their most basic choices and
access to health, reproduction, education, and other economic benefits. For an interesting discussion
of the tensions at the Vienna Conference about this conflict, see Julie Mertus & Pamela Goldberg, A
Perspective on Women and International Human Rights After the Vienna Declaration: The
Inside/Outside Construct,26 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 201 (1994).
146. See Cheryl Johnson-Odim, Common Themes, Different Contexts: Third World Women and
Feminism, in THIRD WORLD WOMEN AND THE PoLmics OF FEMINISM 314, 320 (Chandra Talpade
Mohanty et al. eds., 1991).
147. See Chibundu, supra note 72, at 11 (analyzing the term "equity" as it relates to affirmative
action and international law).
148. See Andrews, supra note 3, at 457.
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of states to provide the kinds of resources required to stem violence against
women. 149 Another way may be in the choices available to women in situations
of widespread illiteracy, a by-product of poverty. 150 In these situations, even
when the state has intervened to stem violence against them, for example,
women can only avail themselves of these benefits if they are empowered to
pursue them.'

Critical race feminism also needs to locate the question of culture, not as
an abstract anthropological phenomenon, but as the vehicle through which
political and economic transformation is negotiated and to which women's
rights often become hostage. 5 Local economic conditions and the symbols and
substance of culture are implicated in, and affected by, global economic
arrangements.' 53 So, for example, in societies where migrant labor, particularly
for women, becomes the norm for certain groups of people, their cultural
arrangements accommodate the mobility (and exploitation) of women.'54
Critical race feminism, with its focus on particularity and intersectionality,
provides the space for an articulation of rights and remedies which takes local
149. My point here is not to excuse states who are unsympathetic or indifferent to the plight of
women. Rather, this point is premised on the assumption that even where governments are willing to
effect some change, the resources they have at their disposal may be limited in light of competing
resource demands.
150. This is a rather basic point and also a hackneyed one. It is now recognized that all the lofty
announcements of governments, through legislation or policy pronouncements, are of no consequence
if women are not aware of them, or feel powerless (for example, through lack of resources or education)
to enforce them. See Abdullalhi Ahmed An-Naim, State Responsibility Under InternationalHuman
Rights Law to ChangeReligious and CustomaryLaws, in HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN: NATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIvES, supra note 19, at 167, 167-88 (outlining the impediments facing
national governments in embracing human rights).
151. See ROXANNA CARRILLO, BATTERED DREAMS: VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AS AN

OBSTACLE TO DEVELOPMENT (1992) (linking gender-based violence to development).
152. I have argued this point in the South African context, where during the constitutional
negotiations, women activists who pushed for universal application of the equality principle were pitted
against "traditionalists" who wanted to exempt traditional practices and institutions from the principle.
See Andrews, supra note 122, at 323. When one deconstructs the conflict, the economic issues surface.
Economic resources were controlled by men. Women were not allowed to become chiefs, a role not
merely symbolic, but one which allowed the chief to allocate resources and generally spread largesse.
See Yvonne Mokgoro, TraditionalAuthorityandDemocracyin the Interim South African Constitution,
3 REV. CONST. STUD. 60, 66 (1996).
153. It has been argued that any analysis of globalization has to incorporate the issue of culture.
Tracey Skelton, Globalization,Culture and Land: The Case of the Caribbean,in GLOBALIZATION:
THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 96, at 318, 320.

I believe that is directly necessary to adopt a cultural focus to what is often called world
politics.... We have come increasingly to recognize that while economic matters are of
tremendous importance in relations between societies and in various forms of transnational
relations these matters are... subject to cultural contingencies and cultural coding.
Id. (citing ROLAND ROBERTSON, GLOBALIZATION, SOCIAL THEORY AND GLOBAL CULTURE 4 (1992)).

154. Id. at 324.
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conditions as the starting point and then engages the universal. t5 5 It is not
fettered by universalist, essentialist notions which start with the universal
woman and then extrapolates local conditions. It insists that the voices from the
margins have a central place in the discourse of international human rights. It
is not just a rhetorical tool; such a perspective includes one of the
underdeveloped world, in other words, those of poor, marginal people.
The implications of an analysis that attempts to fill theoretical gaps and
centralize the perspectives of marginalized groups have some implications for
international human rights practice. This is no small consideration since
arguably human rights law is a question of political will or possibility.' 56
V. CONCLUSION

I have attempted to demonstrate in my remarks that critical race feminism,
although entirely of American vintage, may provide the theoretical potential for
an analysis of marginalized groups in the global human rights framework. In
this endeavor, and utilizing the lens of violence, I have attempted to incorporate
the experiences of Aboriginal women in Australia and black South African
women. Although Australia shares all the traits of a first world country, this is
not the case for Aboriginal peoples. Aboriginal peoples represent the Third
World in Australia by all indicators.' 57 Similarly, black South African women
remain the most disadvantaged within that society.'58
By examining the conditions of Aboriginal women and black women in
South Africa, it is reasonable to conclude that the intersectionality of violence,
race and poverty create the conditions for violence which constitute a
continuous violation of human rights. The purpose of this experiential focus is
not to suggest that the conditions of these two groups of women, or indeed all
women in economically marginalized communities, are interchangeable. Rather
the idea is to highlight certain conditions, such as poverty and violence, which
may coincide across borders and cultures and utilize the possibilities of a
critical race feminism approach.

155. One of critical race theory's most significant contributions has been the suggestion that
attempts to redress injustice and transform the lives of oppressed groups requires an approach which
"looks to the bottom." See generally Matsuda, supra note 12 (arguing that adopting the perspective of
those who have experienced discrimination can greatly assist critical scholars).
156. See generally Chibundu, supra note 60, at 1069 (exploring the implications of using one
domestic court to enforce international human rights).
157. See Andrews, supra note 4, at 918 (stating that Aborigines are the most disadvantaged
Australians and that within Aboriginal communities, women fare the worst).
158. See Andrews, supranote 3, at 430.

